

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 30 August 1951

Director of Central Intelligence
General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

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12262

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
Brigadier General Ernest B. Moore, acting for Director of
Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence,
Atomic Energy Commission
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

25X1 Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
25X1 * [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
[redacted] USA(Ret.), Central
Intelligence Agency
25X1 [redacted] Central Intelligence
Agency
25X1 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
25X1 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
25X1 [redacted] Central Intelligence Agency
Colonel A. C. Boatsman, Department of the Army
Lieut. Colonel Dallas Pilliod, Department of the Army
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Colonel James F. Pinkney, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff
Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

James Q. Reber
Secretary
Intelligence Advisory Committee

*For part of
meeting only

S-E-C-R-E-T
IAC-M-43
30 August 1951

IAC-M-43

30 August 1951

Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 23 August 1951 (IAC-M-42) were approved.

Indications of Soviet Intentions to Initiate General War (IAC-D-33)

2. Action: It was agreed that General Bolling's proposal should be pursued and that the IAC should establish a check list of most significant indicators in the following manner:

a. Each IAC agency should list all indicators of Soviet intentions to initiate general war which fall within an agency's sphere of primary responsibility without regard to length.

b. O/CI in CIA should then combine these lists to be examined by a representative group for the purpose of selecting the most significant factors from the combined list.

c. The final list will be submitted to the IAC for approval.

3. Discussion: Mr. Armstrong expressed his concern that the effort to select out only the most significant indicators might lead to a mechanical handling of the watching process. He believed that certain indications of Soviet intentions could be discovered only by attending to all information, even the relatively obscure and seemingly minor facets of Soviet behavior. General Smith indicated that this venture would not detract from the screening of all possible information nor was there any thought that the watching process should or would be made mechanical by the adoption of an IAC check list. He indicated further that the focusing on major and most significant indicators could serve to make more systematic our watching process.

4. General Smith noted that there would likely be within the U. S. indicators of impending crisis, the responsibility for which would fall on the FBI and that therefore its contribution would be highly desirable.

S-E-C-R-E-T

IAC-M-43

30 August 1951

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IAC-M-43

30 August 1951

India's Position in the East-West
Conflict (NIE-23)

5. Action: This estimate was approved as revised.

6. Discussion: In connection with paragraph 18 of this paper General Smith raised the question of the desirability of intelligence indicating to the policy makers the losses in terms of strategic raw materials in the event certain countries were overrun or lost to the access of the West. There was general agreement that this was a proper mission of intelligence and the members were invited to give this matter some thought in anticipation of such a study in the near future. It was pointed out that certain of these factors would come to light in the preparation of NIE-40 which would deal in part with the value of the satellite and Western Europe to the Soviets and by inference the loss which the West would sustain in the latter case.

Capabilities of the USSR for Clandestine
Attack on the U. S. with Weapons of Mass
Destruction (NIE-31)

7. Action: This estimate was approved as revised. In this connection reference was made to the digest of this paper for use in the preparation of SE-10, the pertinent portion of which will be referred to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference by Mr. Keay who will report its suggestions to Dr. Langer. It was understood however that the reference of the major part of SE-10 to JIG need not be held up pending the FBI report.

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IAC-M-43

30 August 1951